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r IS THIS REALLY NECESSARY? 
INDIRECT TAXATION THROUGH EXPROPRIATION OF 
REGULATORY AGENCY SPECIAL FUNDS: 
THE BUDGET GETS UGLY AND 
THE LEGISLATURE GETS MEAN 
The regulatory agencies of California, 
with few exceptions, are financed from 
·'special funds." The industry or trade 
regulated is assessed license or other fees 
to finance the public agency overseeing it. 
The nature of these funds should not be 
misunderstood; they operate as indirect 
taxes on the consumers of the services 
regulated. A fee imposed across an in-
dustry by state assessment is passed on to 
the consumers of that industry. However, 
a case can be made that if a trade or in-
dustry requires regulation, it probably in-
ures to the benefit of consumers using the 
services involved (at least in theory) and 
they are therefore the appropriate parties 
to pay for it. 
During each of the past two years, the 
legislature and the Governor-through 
the budget process-have required the 
transfer of special fund monies to the 
general fund, to assist the state in 
ameliorating its huge budget deficit. The 
state has robbed Peter and Paul to pay 
itself. 
"Special Funds" 
Means Special Funds 
Most of the agencies monitored in this 
publication are "special-funded" agen-
cies-that is, they are supported solely by 
fees collected from their licensees and ap-
plicants for licensure, fines, and reimbur-
sement for investigative costs. They are 
created in an "enabling act" and, in almost 
every case, authorized to collect fees from 
their licensees for deposit into a special 
fund which is to be used "to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter" or "for support 
of this board" (emphasis added).1 
The legal status of special funds has 
been discussed in two California Supreme 
Court cases addressing diversion of spe-
cial-fund money by the legislature for pur-
poses arguably unrelated to the subject 
agency's function,2 and a 1976 Attorney 
General"s Opinion addressing the author-
ity of the Department of Consumer Affairs 
(DCA) to assess the special funds of its 
constituent agencies for use by its 
Division of Consumer Services for ac-
tivities "reasonably related" to the ac-
tivities of the agencies.3 
In Daugherty v. Riley,4 the California 
Supreme Court invalidated a legislative 
diversion from the Corporations 
Commissioner's special fund, noting that 
monies in the Commissioner's fund were 
collected from "fees for permits and licen-
ses required by law to be issued as a pre-
requisite to the initiation or the carrying 
on of business.''5 Further, these fees, 
which constituted the "sole suiwort" of the 
Department of Corporations, were col-
lected pursuant to a statute providing that 
they were to be deposited into the corpora-
tion commission fund "'to be used by the 
commissioner in carrying out this act. "'7 
The Supreme Court likened the 
Commissioner's special fund to "a trust 
fund raised for a particular purpose in the 
exercise by the state of its police power.''8 
The Court noted: 
They are not state revenues in 
the sense that they may be used for 
any state purpose so long as the 
department is not in need of them, 
and the justification for their col-
lection is to make the department 
self-supporting .... That these spe-
cial funds are raised for regulatory 
purposes and are set apart for the 
exclusive use of the state depart-
ments and agencies for which they 
are imposed and collected cannot 
be doubted. That these funds may 
not be permanently diverted from 
their specific purposes and to such 
an extent as to render the depart-
ment or agency unable to function 
is likewise clear.9 
In Urban v. Riley, to the Supreme Court 
was asked to rule on the validity of a 
similar legislative diversion from the Real 
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Estate Commissioner's special fund. The 
language of the Real Estate Act differed 
from the language of the Corporate 
Securities Act at issue in Daugheny, how-
ever, in that the Real Estate Act expressly 
provided for an annual transfer of excess 
funds from the Real Estate Commission-
er's fund to the general fund. Thus, the 
Court distinguished Daugheny and its 
"trust fund" concept. With regard to the 
constitutionality of a statute mandating 
regular transfer of excess special fund 
monies to the general fund, the Court "as-
sume[ d], without deciding," that the legis-
lature is not precluded from enacting such 
a law, noting that "the mere fact that an 
enactment providing for regulatory fees 
may incidentally produce some revenue 
does not render such enactment uncon-
stitutional."11 
In a I 976 opinion, the Attorney 
General ruled that DCA may assess the 
special funds of its constituent agencies 
for its activities which are "reasonab~ 
related" to the activities of its agencies. 
Funding for anything unrelated properly 
comes from the general fund. Hence, since 
DCA is an umbrella agency over 38 
boards, commissions, and bureaus, and 
performs numerous administrative and 
other tasks for them, it may extract a pro 
rata charge to finance its overhead, its 
Division of Consumer Services, and its 
Division of Administration. Although the 
Attorney General opined that the "trust 
fund" language in Daugherty has been 
"substantially qualified" since its issuance 
(with which we do not necessarily agree), 
and that Urban v. Riley appears to hold that 
the legislature is not constitutionally 
precluded from diverting excess fees from 
special funds so long as the fees imposed 
do not arbitrarily or unreasonably burden 
licensees, the AG also found: 
To the extent that monies deriv-
ed from pro rata assessment are 
used for activities unrelated to the 
individual funds, under the prin-
ciples set forth in Urban v. Riley, 
supra, support of such activities 
from the individual funds would be 
unconstitutional in that the monies 
collected to support such activities 
would be disproportionate to the 
contemplated expense of regula-
tion of the boards, bureaus, and 
commissions within the Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs. 13 
The Budget Crisis Hits: 
Thou Shalt Not Tax; 
No, Thou Shalt Not 
CALL It Taxes 
During early 1991, the California 




dented scope. The state had estimated 
revenues at levels 10-20% above those 
likely to accrue. The shortfall was stagger-
ing. Eventual estimates reached $ I 4 bil-
lion out of a $55 billion total budget. Fur-
ther, most of the state budget is earmarked, 
meaning that the actual cuts as applied 
only to the discretionary part of the budget 
could eviscerate the public sector. That is, 
a 20% overall funding cut would perhaps 
require a 30-40% cut in many programs, 
including law enforcement and justice, 
services for the very poor, and-most 
critically-efforts to assist children. The 
accounts for children had already been 
quietly cut by the state, which never has 
properly factored indices of need, or even 
population increases of children, in cal-
culating budgets year to year. 14 The in-
frastructure, safety net, and societal in-
vestment in our collective future had been 
undercut for years-and now this. 
The legislature faced a profound 
dilemma. Of course, there was an answer. 
What does a family do when an emergen-
cy strikes? It does not place its infants in 
paper bags and toss them off bridges. It 
digs deep. In a recession, we try to stimu-
late business and employment, and we 
may delay space projects, defense spend-
ing, park acquisition, and many other 
things-but we do not forsake our 
children. The members who have extra 
contribute. The recession means that 
many are worse off, but some are 
desperate; there are priorities and there are 
choices. Indeed, all things are relative, and 
for the state of California-one of the 
wealthiest poliucaljurisdictions in the his-
tory of the world-to forswear the ability 
to immunize its children, or to provide 
elementary medical care, or to feed the 
hungry, is pathetic. But the "taxes are too 
high, business will leave" nonsense 
precluded the modest increases required, 
notwithstanding a list of billions of dollars 
of existing tax subsidies for the powerful 
(e.g., oil depletion, bank and insurance 
breaks). Ending these indirect "tax" ex-
penditures would not drive out business in 
any debilitating way. 
The legislature and Governor faced the 
issue to a limited extent in 1991, produc-
ing some needed revenues. And at the 
same time they started thrashing around 
looking for money where it might not be 
called "taxes"; the special funds of the 
agencies became a target. During the sum-
mer of 199 J, Governor Wilson signed AB 
222 (Vasconcellos). Section 14 of this bill 
required the transfer of all "excess fees 
incidentally produced" by state regulatory 
agencies to the general fund on June 30, 
1992. Such "excess fees" were defined to 
mean that an agency could keep the funds 
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it needed to meet its 1991-92 fiscal year 
budget, plus that needed for three addi-
tional months-all monies over this 
amount were taken by the general fund. 
Predictably, agencies responded to this by 
delaying planned fee increases, or by 
spending money quickly, to avoid having 
their funds taken. Nevertheless, the short 
notice produced some remarkable grabs. 
The Contractors State License Board, an 
agency relied upon to enforce standards 
affecting many consumers, lost almost 
$23 million to the general fund. The im-
mediate consequence of this legislative 
taking was the indirect taxation of con-
sumers for general fund purposes, the 
agencies' avoidance of needed fee in-
creases to assure consumer protection out 
of fear of general fund expropriation, and 
a decline in enforcement. 
The Auctioneer Commission's 
Challenge to Legislative Illegality 
Only one agency attempted to chal-
lenge this taking in court. Lo and behold, 
in May 1992 the humble Auctioneer Com-
mission filed a lawsuit challenging the 
validity of section 14 of AB 222 to block 
the taking of its excess reserve fund. At 
this point, the legislature was embroiled in 
Stage Two of the budget crisis: The 
shortfall of 1991-92 was substantially 
replicated for 1992-93, except now the 
Republican Governor was determined to 
stand on principle. Read his lips; down in 
the polls, he would not tax. Well, he would 
not tax where it would be called taxes. 
Amid much wringing of hands by the 
legislature and Governor, the special inter-
ests continued to ply the halls of 
Sacramento to preserve billions in special 
tax subsidies and perks for the oil, alcohol. 
banking, and insurance industries, and to 
preserve inequitable property tax 
windfalls for businesses paying at 1978 
assessments, business lunch and yacht 
club deductions, law student and medical 
student education for wealthy students at 
publicly financed schools. and ... well, you 
get the idea. 
The search was on for the weak and 
uninformed. How to get money and not 
call it taxation-special fund expropria-
tion was again irresistible. There is the 
money; it is in hand. We have to be a bit 
careful in stealing the state pension trust 
money, but here-in the arena of these 
almost invisible regulatory agencies-we 
can take by stealth and bury it all in ac-
counting mumbo-jumbo. Except those 
pesky Auctioneers have the gall to avail 
themselves of the checks and balances 
which assure the rule oflaw; they've gone 
and filed suit. 
The Legislature's Response to 
The Auctioneers' Challenge: 
The Bully Retaliates, or 
''Going ... Going ... Gone'' 
Well. there is a predictable conse-
quence to the enragement of a bully who 
Jacks conscience. The legislature com-
pletely defunded the Auctioneer Commis-
sion in the 1992-93 budget. One might 
argue that criminally buttressed standards 
might suffice to regulate the state's auc-
tioneers, and perhaps the Auctioneer 
Commission is a legitimate object of 
deregulation. Except the legislature did 
not make a deregulation analysis, and 
deregulation of a special-funded agency 
does not produce revenue or effectuate 
savings. Nor has the legislature con-
sidered the defunding (or deregulation) of 
any number of other agencies equally 
deserving of merciful death (the Board of 
Landscape Architects, the Engineers 
board, and many others). The legislature 
simply decided it had to destroy an adver-
sary to prevent the issue from reaching the 
courts, to cloak its illegality, to get away 
scot-free. And it worked. Although the suit 
is still pending technically, there is no 
plaintiff to pursue it. 
Amazingly, the legislature did not 
change the relevant statute. You still must 
have an auctioneer's license to be an auc-
tioneer, but there is no one to license you; 
you still have to post a bond, but there is 
no one to post it with. Judge Roy Bean was 
more sagacious; at least he didn't shoot the 
plaintiff-and before the trial com-
menced. 
1992: The Tiger is Loose; 
Grab Your Children 
Having avoided comeuppance by 
literally destroying the objector, the legis-
lature and the Governor were feeling 
desperation from the continuing shortfall 
and their inability to tax, but they had 
found an opening into one source of 
money and now were ready to pounce 
hard. Yes, it's illegal, but this is politics. 
The newly signed 1992-93 budget re-
quires almost all special-funded agencies 
to cut their 1992-93 expenditures (from 
1991-92 levels) by I 0%, and to transfer 
that 10% to the general fund on June 30. 
1993. That is a huge cut, especially for the 
smaller agencies. For many, meaningful 
discipline to protect the public is 
precluded. Query whether such agencies 
should exist at all where relied upon to 
provide a measure of protection they can-
not physically provide? But they had a use 
for the legislature and the Governor: They 
had money and the ability to assess fees 
("fees," not "taxes''). 
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The new budget does not authorize 
cuts in license fees, just in expenditures, 
across the board and without regard to 
need or justification or consequence. The 
savings produced by this reduction be-
come excess funds which will be taken 
next June. Last year, our lawmakers 
stripped these special-funded agencies of 
"excess" reserve funds. This time, the 
taking is the equivalent of a direct assess-
ment on the operating budgets of special-
funded agencies. The legislature may be 
able to alter its statutes to permit such a 
contribution, but it cannot do so solely 
through the budget process (which is 
bound by existing law) nor can it do so 
retroactively. Even if we generously con-
cede to the bare legality of the I 991 move 
under Urban, the 1992 theft directly from 
the special funds of these regulatory agen-
cies for purposes wholly unrelated to the 
agencies' functions falls squarely into the 
unconstitutional hole identified by the 
California Supreme Court in Daugherty 
and grudgingly admitted by the Attorney 
General in his 1976 opinion. 
The Legacy of Special Fund 
Taking: Agency Impotence 
This official "theft" of money gathered 
for a specific purpose allows the special 
interests who largely control the agencies 
purportedly regulating them to object to 
any further increases in fees. "The last 
time we agreed to a fee increase, the legis-
lature took it for the general fund. We 
aren't going to do it again," they will 
argue. They will then wax self-righteous 
all over the Capitol and stop any fee in-
crease for years thereafter, using the 
general fund leakage as their rationale. 
This will accomplish two purposes for 
them: It allows them to tell their member-
ship that they have stood up for their 
economic interests, and it allows them to 
prevent any meaningful reform or 
strengthening of the discipline systems 
financed by those fees. 
You might ask what difference it 
makes how an industry trade association 
or political action committee feels about a 
fee assessment to finance the regulation of 
its members. You might ask, but you won't 
if you know anything about state govern-
ment. Unless there are unusual cir-
cumstances, the industry or trade must 
sign off on a fee increase or it will not 
happen. Those who hold fast to ninth-
grade civics principles (and God bless 
you) will rightly ask, "Wait a second! How 
did they get this veto power? Have the 
inmates taken over the asylum?" The 
answer is that they have taken over the 
whole town. 
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Why would the trade association lob-
byists who speak for an industry care 
about a fee which is passed on to con-
sumers? Not because they care about con-
sumers. Nor is it much of a burden for 
most licensees. For example, the extra 
$ I 00 per year needed to finance a decent 
system of physician discipline is not much 
to ask from doctors. The total dues of the 
California Medical Associat10n are at least 
four times greater than the license and 
related fees paid by physicians. If proper 
regulation reduces medical malpractice 
claims by but 3%, much more than $100 
per physician would be saved on the 
$25,000-$50,000 in annual malpractice 
insurance premiums many of them pay. 
The next question is why a trade as-
sociation would object to a minor increase 
of this amount to finance the protection of 
the public from incompetent or dishonest 
practitioners. After all, aren't most 
physicians (or other professionals) com-
petent and honest and desirous of excising 
those who are not from their profession? 
Yes, most are. But their trade associations 
and PACs do not represent those instincts. 
Rather, they tend to represent the "ter-
ritory" of the profession or trade, includ-
ing the interests of those who abuse the 
public. This predilection is an empirical 
constant of trade association behavior. 
Conclusion 
Okay, there is an emergency. But 
where there is an emergency, take emer-
gency action. Tax the wealthy; they have 
benefitted from tremendous tax cuts over 
the past ten years. Tax oil; California is 
one of the few states which does not tax 
the oil taken from its soil. Tax insurance 
and banking; they are both now cross-sub-
sidized by other taxpayers. There are 
many alternatives. Interestingly, a recent 
poll commissioned by Children's Hospi-
tals found that even the heavily taxed mid-
dle class would be willing to pay a bit 
more if the money were to go for the 
benefit of children-who are the ones dis-
proportionately suffering from the current 
shortfall. In fact, the margin of public con-
cern about underfunding those most in 
need is remarkable, with almost 70% will-
ing to pay more in taxes for these pur-
poses. But, rather than presenting such an 
alternative or engaging in honest dis-
course, both the legislature and Governor 
are skulking around and stealing money 
from funds dedicated to a particular use, 
violating the rule of law in doing so, and 
retaliating against one legitimately at-
tempting to invoke court judgment. These 
are not the methods of responsible or 
honest government. 
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